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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2 and Article VIII, Section 3. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
(1) Did the district court err in interpreting the mandatory provision of Rule 
25(f), as discretionary? The rule is restated here as follows: "[w]ithin 60 days after 
receiving a respondent's petition for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall 
either: (1) advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel will stipulate to 
the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or (2) file a written objection to the 
petition" Similarly, did the district court err in treating as discretionary the mandatory 
provision of Rule 25(g) that "district court shall within 90 days of the filing of the 
petition" hold a hearing on the petition if an objection was timely filed by OPC. The 
standard of appellate review of the legal question involving statutory interpretation is 
correction of error without any deference to the district court. Scharfv. BMG Corp,, 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Additionally, under the Supreme Court's constitutional 
charge to supervise the admission, the practice of law, and discipline of lawyers, the 
standard is for correctness of the actions taken by the district court as agent of the 
Supreme Court. In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). R. 528 - 541. 
(2) Did the district court err in finding as a matter of law that the time for filing 
of the Objection by OPC to the Petition starts running from the time the Petition was filed 
rather than from the time of receipt of a copy of the Petition by the OPC? Additionally, 
did the district court err in finding that the receipt of a copy of the Petition by the 
common receptionist at the Law and Justice Center who delivered the copy of the Petition 
to the attorney for the Bar's Admission the same day, June 29, 2001, was not effective 
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until the Bar Admission's attorney deliver the same to the OPC two days later, July 2, 
2001? These are questions of law the Supreme Court decides without any deference to 
the district court. Scharfv, BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Additionally, 
under the Supreme Court's constitutional charge to supervise the admission, the practice 
of law, and discipline of lawyers, the standard is for correctness of the actions taken by 
the district court as agent of the Supreme Court. In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 
1236 (Utah 1998). R. 749-756. 
(3) Is the Utah State Bar's ("Bar") wrongful imposition of Rules 14 and 6-1 of 
the Rules of Admissions to preclude Petitioner/Appellant ("Appellant") from taking the 
July 2001 Bar Examination and the Multi state Professional Responsibility Examination 
("Bar exams") good and sufficient reason for the district court to abate the requirement of 
taking and passing said examinations as provided for under Rule 25, Rules of Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability ("RLDD")? This is a question of law the Supreme Court 
decides without any deference to the district court. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). Additionally, under the Supreme Court's constitutional charge to 
supervise the admission, the practice of law, and discipline of lawyers, the standard is for 
correctness of the actions taken by the district court as agent of the Supreme Court. In re 
Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). R. 537-540. 
(4) Is the Character and Fitness Committee's ("committee") wrongful 
application of the broad standard under Rules 14 and 6-1 good and sufficient reason for 
the district court to disregard the recommendation of the Committee and abate this 
requirement as provided for under Rule 25, RLDD? This is a question of law the 
Supreme Court decides without any deference to the district court. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Additionally, under the Supreme Court's 
constitutional charge to supervise the admission, the practice of law, and discipline of 
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lawyers, the standard is for correctness of the actions taken by the district court as agent 
of the Supreme Court. In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). R. 
534-537. 
(5) Does the Bar's imposition of Rule 14 and Rule 6-1, Rules of Admissions, 
instead of Rule 25, RLDD, a violation of Appellant's Equal Protection Rights and Due 
Process Rights as guaranteed under the United States Constitution and Utah Constitution 
that Appellant had been subjected to a different admissions procedure than from other 
similarly situated applicants; and that Appellant was denied due process when he was 
subjected to a higher standard for ethical qualification? This is a question of law for the 
Supreme Court to decide for correctness. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1985); West Valley City v. Roberts, 993 P.2d 252 (UT App. 1999). Additionally, 
under the Supreme Court's constitutional charge to supervise the admission, the practice 
of law, and discipline of lawyers, the standard is for correctness of the actions taken by 
the district court as agent of the Supreme Court. In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 
1236 (Utah 1998). This issue was not specifically raised below; however, the issue is 
clearly present under the undisputed procedural facts and the fact that Appellant is a 
member of a protected class. This is a significant constitutional questions that affects or 
jeopardizes Appellant's liberty and property rights. 
(6) Does the Utah lawyer supervision and disciplinary procedure violate the 
constitutional mandate for separation of power; and this violation in turn violate the Equal 
Protection rights of the Appellant in particular and Utah licensed lawyers in general in 
that other Utah licensed professionals are protected from the whim of one department of 
state government through a procedure involving participation by all three separate 
departments (Executive, Judiciary and Legislative), while lawyer supervision and 
discipline is limited to one department, the judiciary? This is a question of law to be 
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decided for correctness. Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); West 
Valley City v. Roberts, 993 P.2d 252 (UT App. 1999); In re Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 
1233, 1236 (Utah 1998). This issue was not specifically raised below; however, the issue 
is clearly present under the undisputed procedural facts and the fact that Appellant is a 
member of a protected class. This issue is a significant constitutional question that affects 
or jeopardizes Appellant's liberty and property rights. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
AND REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE AND/OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL. 
1. Rule 25. Reinstatement following a suspension of more than six months; 
readmission. 
(a) Generally. A respondent suspended for more than six months or a disbarred 
respondent shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the district court. No 
respondent may petition for reinstatement until three months before the period for 
suspension has expired. No respondent may petition for readmission until five years after 
the effective date of disbarment. A respondent who has been placed on interim suspension 
and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim 
suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration oi five years from the effective 
date of the interim suspension. 
(b) Petition. A petition for reinstatement or readmission shall be verified, filed with 
the district court, and shall specify with particularity the manner in which the respondent 
meets each of the criteria specified in paragraph (e) or, if not, why there is otherwise good 
and sufficient reason for remstatement or readmission. Unless abated by the district court, 
the petition must be accompanied by an advance cost deposit in the amount set from time 
to time by the Board of Commissioners to cover anticipated costs of the proceeding. Prior 
to or as part of the respondent's petition, the respondent may request modification or 
abatement of conditions of discipline, reinstatement or readmission. 
c) Service of petition. The respondent shall serve a copy of the petition upon OPC 
counsel. 
(d) Publication of notice of petition. At the time a respondent files a petition for 
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall publish a notice of the petition in the 
Utah Bar Journal. The notice shall inform members of the Bar about the application for 
reinstatement or readmission, and shall request that any individuals file notice of their 
opposition or concurrence with the district court within 30 days of the date of publication. 
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In addition, OPC counsel shall notify each complainant in the disciplinary proceeding that 
led to the respondent's suspension or disbarment that the respondent is applying for 
reinstatement or readmission, and shall inform each complamant that the complainant has 
30 days from the date of mailing to raise objections to or to support the respondent's 
petition. Notice shall be mailed to the last known address of each complainant in OPC 
counsel's records. 
(e) Criteria for reinstatement and readmission. A respondent may be reinstated or 
readmitted only if the respondent meets each of the following criteria, or, if not, presents 
good and sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be reinstated or 
readmitted: 
(1) The respondent has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all 
prior disciplinary orders except to the extent they are abated by title district 
court. 
(2) The respondent has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law uunng the period of suspension or disbarment. 
(3) If the respondent was suffering from a physical or mental disability or 
impairment which was a causative factor of the respondent's misconduct, 
including substance abuse, the disability or impairment has been removed. 
Where substance abuse was a causative factor m the respondent's 
misconduct, the respondent shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless: 
(A) the respondent has recovered from the substance abuse as 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; 
(B) the respondent has abstained from the use of the abused 
suostance and the unlawful use of controlled substances for the 
preceding six months; and 
(C) the respondent is likely to continue to abstain from the substance 
abused and the unlawful use of controlled substances. 
(4) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the respondent was disciplined, 
the respondent has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. In 
readmission cases, the respondent must appear before the Bar's Character 
and Fitness Committee and cooperate in its investigation of the respondent. 
A copy of the Character and Fitness Committee's report and 
recommendation shall be forwarded to the district court assigned to the 
petition. 
-5-
(5) The respondent has kept informed about recent developments in the law 
and is competent to practice. 
(6) In cases of suspensions for one year or more, the respondent shall be 
required to pass the Multi state Professional Responsibility Examination. 
(7) In all cases of disbarment, the respondent shall be required to pass the 
student applicant bar examination and the Multi state Professional 
Responsibility Examination. 
(f) Review of petition. Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition for 
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either: 
(1) advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel will 
stipulate to the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or 
(2) file a written objection to the petition. 
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by OPC counsel, the district court shall, 
within 90 days ofthe filing of the petition, conduct a hearing at which the respondent 
shall have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the 
respondent has met each ofthe criteria in paragraph (e) or, if not, that there is good and 
sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted. The 
district court shall enter its findings and order. If no objection is filed by OPC counsel, the 
district court shall review the petition without a hearing and enter its findings and order. 
fh) Successive petitions. Unless otherwise ordered by the district court, no 
respondent shall apply for reinstatement or readmission within one year following ah 
adverse judgment upon a petition for reinstatement or readmission. 
(i) Conditions of reinstatement or readmission. The district court may impose conditions 
on a respondent's reinstatement or readmission if the respondent has met the burden of 
proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, but the district court reasonably believes 
that further precautions should be taken to ensure that the public will be protected upon 
the respondent's return to practice. 
(j) Reciprocal reinstatement or readmission. If a respondent has been suspended or 
disbarred solely on the basis of discipline imposed by another court, another jurisdiction, 
or a regulatory body having disciplinary jurisdiction, and if the respondent is later 
reinstated or readmitted by that court, jurisdiction or regulatory body, the respondent may 
petition for reciprocal reinstatement or readmission in this state. The respondent shall file 
with the district court and serve upon OPC counsel a petition for reciprocal reinstatement 
or readmission, as the case may be. The petition shall include a certified or otherwise 
authenticated copy ofthe order of reinstatement or readmission from the other court, 
jurisdiction or regulatory body. Within 20 days of service ofthe petition, OPC counsel 
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may file an objection thereto based solely upon substantial procedural irregularities. If an 
objection is fifed, the district court shall hold a hearing and enter its findings and order. If 
no objection is filed, the district court shall enter its order based upon the petition. 
2. Article V, Section 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted. 
3. Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
4. Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
5. Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein tney reside. 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of tne United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of tne male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of 
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the Unitea States, or as a member of any state legislature, or 
as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United 
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or 
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comfort to the enemies thereof But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion 
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all 
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the case, proceeding and disposition below. 
The case arose from Appellant's application for reinstatement to membership in 
the Utah State Bar. Appellant first inquired of the Bar as to what he should do to be 
readmitted to membership in the Bar. The Bar send Appellant an application package 
which he completed and timely submitted. R. 44- 71,151-171, 544-575. The Character 
and committee denied the application resulting in Appellant being precluded from taking 
the Bar exams. R. 72-73, 577-578. The Appellant requested a hearing and one was held 
before the committee. While preparing for the hearing, Appellant discovered that he bad 
been subjected to the wrong procedure for readmission in that the proper procedure was 
pursuant to Rule 25, RLDD. Appellant appeared at the committee hearing and objected 
on the ground that Rule 25 RLDD controls his application for reinstatement. The 
Appellant, however, stayed and participated in the hearing, answering committee 
inquiries to comply with Rule 25 RLDD requirement for him to appear before the same 
committee and answer questions. R. 582-595. Following the hearing Appellant filed his 
Verified Petition for Reinstatement pursuant to Rule 25 RLDD. R. 1-37. Pursuant to the 
same rule, Appellant requested the Bar to allow him to take the Bar exams. The Bar 
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refused and the Appellant sought a Writ of Mandamus to the Bar from the district court. 
R. 38-73. The district court denied on the ground that Rules 14 and 6-1 of the Bar Rules 
of Admissions govern Appellant's application. R. 124-125,177-179. Appellant sought a 
Writ of Mandamus from this Court, and this Court denied the Writ but acknowledged 
that Rule 25 RLDD controls Appellant's application for reinstatement. R. 614. 
In the meantime, Rule 25, RLDD time provisions were running on Appellant's 
petition. The 60 days limitation for the Bar to file an objection ran before an objection 
was filed. The 90 days for a hearing also ran. The hearing was finally set 23 days out of 
time. At the hearing, Appellant raised the issues of the untimely objection and hearing. 
R. 749-756. Furthermore, since Appellant was wrongfully precluded from taking the Bar 
exams, and the committee applied the wrong rule in recommending against the petition, 
that these requirements should be abated as provided for under Rule 25(b). Finally, the 
Appellant urged the district court, under the circumstances, Appellant was entilled, 
consistent with the mandate of Rule 25g ["court shall review the petition without a 
hearing and enter its findings and order"], for the district court to review his petition 
without a hearing. R. 538-539. Alternatively, Appellant suggested to the district court to 
dismiss the petition so Appellant can appeal to this Court the issues as raised in 
connection with the operation of Rule 25 RLDD. The district court chose to dismiss or 
deny the petition and this appeal ensued. 
2. Statement of Facts relevant to the issues present for review 
(1) In or about February, 2001, Appellant inquired of the Bar about the 
-9-
procedure for reinstatement. The Bar provided Appellant with an admissions package 
that conforms to Rule 14 and 6-1 of the Rules for Admission.1 R. 44-71. 
(2). On or about April 3, 200 la Appellant completed the Application 
form that was a part of the admissions package and timely filed the Application with all 
required attachments and paid the application fee. Id. 
(3). On or about May 29, 2001, Appellant received a letter from the Bar 
denying his application to sit for the July, 2001 bar examination. The letter also advised 
Appellant that he could request a formal hearing. Appellant immediately requested a 
hearing. R. 72-73. 
(4). On or about June 24, 2001, Appellant received a copy of the 
Confidential Character and Fitness Report. R. 529. 
(5). The formal hearing on the committee's denial of Appellant's 
application to take the bar examination was set for June 26, 2001. R-580. 
(6). While preparing for the hearing, Appellant discovered that he had 
been subjected to an erroneous process. That Rule 25, RLDD governs his reinstatement. 
Under Rule 25, the district court, not the Bar, has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire 
reinstatement process. Accordingly, Appellant appeared at the hearing and objected that 
the committee does not have the right under Rule 25, to decide whether or not Appellant 
1
 At the time, Appellant was not aware that Rule 25, Rules of Lawyer Discipline 
and Disability governs his application for readmission rather then Rule 14 and 6-1 of 
Rules for Admission. 
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can take the bar examination. The hearing proceeded nonetheless pursuant to Rule 14 
and 6-1 of the Rules for Admissions. Under Rule 14, unless the committee is satisfied 
that the Appellant has met the broad subjective standard of Rule 6-1, the Appellant would 
be denied the opportunity to take the July 2001 bar examination. R. 582-595. 
(7). On June 29, 2001, pursuant to Rule 25 Appellant hand-delivered, 
and the Utah State Bar received, a copy of the Verified Petition for Reinstatement 
("petition"). R. 1-37, 597. 
(8). On July 3, 2001, Appellant filed with the Fourth District Court, the 
petition and a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ to the Bar compelling it to allow 
Appellant to take the July 2001 bar examination. On July 19, 2001, the hearing on the 
Petition for an Extra Ordinary Writ was heard before honorable Donald J. Eyre, district 
judge of the Fourth District Court, Fillmore, Utah, and the court denied the petition on the 
ground that Rules 14 and 6-1 was controlling. R. 124-125,177-179. 
(9). On July 20, 2001, Appellant filed an Emergency Petition to a Single 
Justice of the Supreme Court for an Extraordinary Writ to the Bar to compel it to allow 
Appellant to take the July 2001 bar exams. R. 603-612. 
(10). On July 23, 2001, Honorable Richard C. Howe, Chief Justice, issued 
the following Order: 
The specific relief requested by Petitioner A. Paul Schwenke, 
an order requiring the Utah State Bar to permit him to sit for 
the July 2001 Bar Examination, is denied. The court will 
consider his petition in relation to the requirement of sitting 
for the Bar Examination pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of 
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Lawyer Discipline and Disability and issue an order in due 
course. (Emphasis added). R. 614. 
(11). July 25 and 26, 2001, the July 2001 bar examination was 
administered. The Bar would not allow Appellant to take the bar examination. R. 531. 
(12). On August 20, 2001, Honorable Justice Matthew B. Durrant, issued 
the following Order 
The petition for an extraordinary writ is dismissed. Petitioner 
should proceed in the district court pursuant to the dictates of 
rule 25 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. 
(Emphasis added). R. 617-619. 
(13). On or about August 22, 2001, Appellant was served with a copy of 
the belated committee's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation 
("report"). R. 621-631. 
(14). On or about August 29, 2001, the Bar served its discovery requests. 
(15). On August 30, 2001 the Bar filed its Memorandum in Opposition to 
the Verified Petition for Reinstatement, outside of the 60 days. R. 637-646. 
(16). On October 12, 2001, the Bar served its Motion to Compel 
(17). At the telephone scheduling conference on October 17, 2001 the 
court set the matter for a hearing on October 24, 2001. The court also allowed dis-
positive motions to be filed and to be heard on the morning of the hearing. 
(18). Appellant filed a Motion to Strike the Bar's Objection to the petition 
on the ground that it was untimely. The Appellant also moved to strike the 
Recommendation of the committee on the ground that committee hearing was conducted 
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under the erroneous Rule 14 and standard of Rule 6-1 which are broad scope as opposed 
to the limited scope of Rule 25. The Appellant also moved to strike all the pending 
discovery requests because the normal discovery procedure are not appropriate for a 
shortened and summary nature of a Reinstatement proceeding. R. 526-633. 
(19). The Appellant's motions and the Bar's motions to compel and in 
limine were argued to the court on the morning of the hearing. The court denied the Bar's 
motions and the Appellant's motions except the motion to strike the discovery requests. 
R. 749-756. 
(20). At the commencement of Appellant's case, the Appellant declined to 
present evidence and requested for the court to rule on the petition without a hearing or to 
dismiss so Appellant could present his case to the Supreme Court. The court dismissed 
the case and this appeal followed. Id. 
(21). The facts before the court through the petition and supporting 
documents are as follows: 
(a) The Appellant has fully complied with the terms and 
conditions of all prior disciplinary order. 
(b) The Appellant had been disbarred for eight years. 
(c) The Appellant had complied with the Restitution order 
through an execution sale of his home. 
(d) Appellant has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the 
unauthorized practice of law during the period of disbarment. 
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(e) Appellant had kept abreast of legal developments through 
subscriptions and consultation with lawyers. 
(f) Appellant's disbarment was not the result of suffering from 
physical or mental disability or impairment, including substance 
abuse. 
(h) The Appellant, notwithstanding the conduct he was disbarred 
for, has the requisite "honesty and integrity" to practice law. The 
committee report should be stricken because it was prepared under 
the wrong standard of Rule 14 and 6-1 of the Rules of Admissions, 
(i) Appellant appeared before the Bar's committee cooperated 
with its investigation. 
(j) Appellant was wrongfully precluded by the Bar from taking 
the July 2001 Bar Examination and the Multi state Professional 
Responsibility Examination. For this reason the court should abate 
the examination requirements. R. 1-37. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Rule 25, RLDD is a special proceeding for the benefit of the lawyer suspended 
over six months or disbarred, to expedite his or her application for membership in the 
Bar. Accordingly, the use in Rule 25 of the imperative "shall" means the time limits are 
mandatory and strictly applied. Here, the OPC missed the 60 day deadline to file an 
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objection to the Petition and the court missed the 90 day deadline to hold a hearing. 
Because OPC and the district court missed the deadlines, the option provided in Rule 25 
for the review and ruling on the Petition without a hearing is the proper remedy. 
Because the Bar precluded Appellant from taking the Bar exams as a result of the 
Bar insistence on imposing the wrong rule, and the committee's application of the wrong 
procedure and standard to Appellant's application should be good and sufficient grounds 
for abating the examination and the committee recommendation criteria for admission. 
Rule 25 governs applications for reinstatement for lawyers suspended for over six 
months and disbarred lawyers. Appellant is a member of this class. The Bar treated 
Appellant differently from this class of lawyers when he was singled out and subjected to 
a procedure and standard different from Rule 25. Appellant is also a member of a race 
protected class. The Bar's disparate treatment of Appellant is a violation of his Equal 
Protection and Due Process rights. 
Finally, the Supreme Court exercise of the three powers of govern in regulating 
lawyers is a violation of the separation of power's Article of the Utah Constitution and 
United States Constitution. Since other professionals licensed by die state of Utah are 
regulated by all three department of the state government, the different treatment of the 




1. The district court erred in disregarding the mandatory 
nature of Rule 25(f) and 25(g), RLDD. 
The Appellant served his Petition for Reinstatement upon the Office of 
Professional Conduct ("OPC") on June 29, 2002, by hand-delivering a copy of the 
Petition to the receptionist at the Bar building at 645 South 200 East, Salt Lake City. On 
August 30, 2002, 62 days since receipt of a copy of the Petition, the OPC filed and served 
a Memorandum in Opposition to the Appellant's petition for reinstatement. The 
controlling rule provides that, 
Within 60 days after receiving a respondent's petition for 
reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either: (1) 
advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel 
will stipulate to the respondent's reinstatement or readmission; 
or (2) file a written objection to the petition." Rule 25(f), 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD"). 
The district court commented that some statutes use the term "shall" but they are often 
interpreted to be discretionary, inferring that this rule is one that is really discretionary 
rather than mandatory. 
If indeed the term "shall" as used in this rule and in this context is meant to be 
discretionary, why didn't the drafters of the provision use terms that are not mandatory or 
imperative such as "may". Perhaps it was because the provision meant what it said, that 
the 60 days must be adhered to. The mandatory meaning of the term "shall" is also 
consistent with the drafters of the rule's proclamation that "[t]he Rules of Professional 
Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of 
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legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the 
terms "shall" or "shall not." Preamble: Lawyer's Responsibility, Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Emphasis added). Accordingly, as used in the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
"shall5' or "shall not" are imperatives that must be complied with. 
A strict adherence to the time limitations is also consistent with the nature and 
special circumstances of a Rule 25, RLDD proceeding. The drafters of the rule are 
apparently cognizant of the fact that a lawyer suspended for over six months or disbarred 
for over five years has been deprived of practicing his or her chosen profession for 
sometime. The underpinnings of Rule 25, RLDD, is clearly to provide a special 
proceeding to accord the disbarred lawyer an expedited means for regaining membership 
in the Bar. If fact, the entire proceedings could conceivably be concluded in 90 days or a 
few days thereafter. Indeed, the OPC is required to file an objection in 60 days and only 
when it has timely filed an objection will there be a hearing. The hearing must be 
conducted within 90 days from the date of filing of the Petition. If there is no objection, 
the district court could conceivably rule in 60 days based on the Verified Petition. The 
statement of this shortened or expedited proceeding is clear and unambiguous under sub-
paragraph (g) which provides as follows: 
(g) Hearing; report. If an objection is filed by OPC counsel, 
the district court shall within 90 days of the filing of the 
petition, conduct a hearing at which the respondent shall have 
the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the respondent has met each of the criteria in 
paragraph (e) or, if not, that there is good and sufficient 
reason why the respondent should nevertheless be reinstated 
-17-
or readmitted. The district court shall enter its findings and 
order. If no objection is filed by OPC counsel the district 
court shall review the petition without a hearing and enter its 
findings and order. Rule 25(g) RLDD (Emphasis added). 
Compared to the usual or typical civil case, Rule 25 RLDD is clearly an expedited or 
shortened proceeding for the benefit of the applicant for reinstatement. Against the 
purpose of the special Rule 25 proceeding, it follows that the use of the imperative term 
"shall" was intended to impose strict adherence to the time limitations. 
The Petition was filed on July 3, 2001. The latest a hearing could have been 
timely under Rule 25, assuming an objection was timely filed, would have been October 
1, 2001. The hearing based on OPC's untimely filed Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Petition for Reinstatement was held on October 24, 2001. Accordingly, the hearing was 
held 113 days from the date the Petition was fried which is 23 days out of time. The 
hearing accordingly violated the 90 days mandate of Rule 25(g). The Appellant has a 
right under Rule 25 to an expedited proceeding for reinstatement to membership in the 
Bar. The OPC violated that right when it failed to comply with the mandatory time 
limitations imposed under Rule 25. The district court violated that right when it failed to 
set a hearing within 90 days from the date of filing of the petition. The Appellant in the 
interest of justice and fair play should not to be penalized for OPC and the district court's 
failure to comply with the rules. Accordingly, Appellant respectfully urges the Court to 
immediately reverse the district court and remand this matter for the district court to 
"review the petition without a hearing and enter its findings and order. 
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2. The district court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that 
the time for OPC to file an objection to the Petition starts 
running from the time the Petition was filed rather than 
when the OPC received a copy of the Petition. 
Rule 25, RLDD in pertinent part provides that "Within 60 days after receiving a 
respondent's petition for reinstatement or readmission, OPC counsel shall either: (1) 
advise the respondent and the district court that OPC counsel will stipulate to the 
respondent's reinstatement or readmission; or (2) file a written objection to the petition." 
Rule 25(f). (Emphasis added). The operative act is not the filing of the Petition but the 
receiving by OPC of a copy of the Petition. The copy of the Petition was hand-delivered 
to the OPC at the Utah Law & Justice Center, 645 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, and 
received by OPC on June 29, 2001. R. 5. The district court's holding was in err because 
the meaning of the provision requires receipt by OPC as opposed to filing of the Petition 
as the operative event for the 60 day time limitation to run. Appellant clearly complied 
with the rule and this Court is urged to apply the plain meaning of the rule and reverse the 
district court's erroneous holding. 
3. The district court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that 
the service of a copy of the Petition upon the common 
receptionist at the Law and Justice center who deliver the 
copy of the petition to the attorney for the Bar's 
Admissions office was not effective until said Bar 
Admission's attorney deliver the copy of the Petition to 
the Disciplinary Counsel two or three days later? 
The district court adopted the OPC's assertion that the date it was served or 
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received a copy of the Petition was July 1, 2001, the date that OPC admitted that it 
received a copy of the Petition from the attorney for the Admission Section or 
department of the Bar, notwithstanding the common receptionist, by affidavit, admitted 
to have received a copy of the Petition on July 29, 2001. The OPC claimed that service 
on the common receptionist at the Law and Justice Center is not service on OPC. 
Additionally, receipt by the attorney for the Bar Admission department of the Bar is not 
the same as receipt by the OPC, another department of the Bar. 
The court erred because the copy of the Petition was admittedly received by the 
common receptionist, and the same was admittedly received by the Bar's attorney for the 
Admission's department, the same day, June 29, 2002. To require more, as the district 
court did here, creates an unfair and unjustified burden on litigants in opposition to the 
Bar. Moreover, to affirm the district court's acceptance of the different department 
argument is tantamount to providing the Bar special treatment and opportunity for abuse. 
Under this view, the Bar can literally avoid service of any process it doesn't like by 
simply asserting that the process was served upon the wrong department. Accordingly, 
the Court is respectfully urged to hold that service upon one section or department of the 
Bar is service upon all departments, and further finds as a matter of law that the OPC 
received a copy of the Petition on June 29, 2001, and had until August 28, 2001 to file an 
objection to the Petition. Accordingly, the filing of the Memorandum in Opposition to 
the Petition on August 30, 2001 was untimely and the objection to Appellant's Petitioner 
for reinstatement must be stricken. Without a timely objection, the district court should 
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be ordered, pursuant to Rule 25(g), to "review the petition without a hearing and enter its 
findings and order". 
4. The Bar's wrongful imposition of Rules 14 and 6-1 of 
Rules of Admissions to preclude Appellant from taking 
the July 2001 Bar Examination and the Multi state 
Professional Responsibility Examination is good and 
sufficient reason for the district court to abate the 
requirement of taking and passing said examinations. 
Rule 25, RLDD provides in pertinent parts that "[a] respondent may be reinstated 
or readmitted only if the respondent meets each of the following criteria, or, if not 
presents good and sufficient reason why the respondent should nevertheless be reinstated 
or readmitted;" Rule 25(e), RLDD. It is unlikely that any applicant to membership in the 
Bar has gone through so much hassle to take the bar exams as did the Appellant here. 
Appellant was precluded, not by any fault of his, but by the Bar's insistence that Rule 14 
and 6-1 of the Admissions Rules apply to his application. This Court has affirmed that 
Rule 25, RLDD is the proper procedure for the Appellant to seek reinstatement. The Bar, 
who is charged with knowing the right procedure, has clearly made a mistake in this case. 
The Bar made a mistake but it is the Appellant that is and has been penalized for that 
mistake. If the Bar had followed the proper procedure under Rule 25, RLDD, the 
Appellant would have taken and passed the bar exams. Justice and fair play demands that 
Appellant should not be penalized for the Bar's mistake. Accordingly, the honorable 
Court is respectfully urged to hold as a matter of law, that the wrongful preclusion of 
Appellant by the Bar from taking the bar exams, is good and sufficient reason for the 
district court to abate the requirement for the Appellant to take and pass the bar exams. 
5 Is the committee's wrongful application of the broad 
standard under Rules 14 and 6-1 good and sufficient 
reason for the district court to disregard the 
recommendation of the committee. 
Preliminarily, the Court is respectively urged to give some consideration to the 
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sequence of events when the committee denied Appellant's application and opportunity to 
take the bar exams. On May 29, 2001, the committee pursuant to the procedure set forth 
under Rule 14, and the standard set forth under Rule 6-1, Rules for Admission, denied 
Appellant's application to take the July 2001 bar exams. The notice of this decision did 
not offer any basis or support for the committee's conclusions. Twenty one days later on 
June 20, 2001, Appellant received a copy of the Confidential Character and Fitness 
Report. Apparently, when the committee formed its conclusions on May 29, 2001, the 
investigation was either on going or had not started at all. That presents an important 
question. Did the committee reach its conclusion first, than conduct an investigation to 
support it? The court is respectfully urged to keep this question in mind while reviewing 
the committee's Findings and Conclusions. R. 621-631. The committee conducted its 
hearing pursuant to Rule 14 and 6-1 of the Rules of Admissions as opposed to Rule 25 
RLDD. R. 582-595. The committee's ruling was expressly pursuant to the same Rules 
of Admissions. R. 629. 
First of all, the report is the result of an investigation under Rule 14, and the 
standard set forth under Rule 6-1 of the Rules of Admission. That standard is stated in 
part as follows: 
[Does the] attorney's conduct. . . conform to the requirements 
of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the 
attorney's business and personal affairs. An attorney should 
be one whose record of conduct justifies the trust of clients, 
adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the professional 
duties owed to them. An applicant whose record manifests a 
significant deficiency in the nonesty, trustworthiness, 
diligence, or reliability shall be denied admission. (Emphasis 
added). Rule 6-1, Rules for Admissions. 
This standard is very broad and includes revisiting the conduct that resulted in the 
prior disbarment, any other conducts both within and without the legal profession and the 
petitioner's personal affairs. In contrast, the Rule 25 investigation is very limited and 
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focus only on conducts that demonstrate "honesty and integrity to practice law". Rule 25 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Notwithstanding the conduct for which the respondent was 
disciplined, the respondent has the requisite honesty and 
integrity to practice law. (Emphasis added) 
The clear scope of the rule begins with the conduct that Appellant was disbarred for. 
Appellant contends that "notwithstanding that conduct" means the committee's 
investigation does not consider that prior conduct and the circumstances surroimding the 
disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the disbarment. Under this standard, the 
committee is limited to investigating only conducts relevant to whether or not the 
Appellant has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. The report is expressly 
based on the broad scope of Rule 6-1 of the Rules of Admission. As a result, the 
committee's investigation dwelled mostly on matters clearly outside of a limited 
investigation under Rule 25. The committee focused a substantial part of the hearing on 
the conduct that was the subject of the prior disbarment. Because the committee focused 
on the prior disciplinary proceeding contrary to Rule 25, the committee was in fact 
prejudiced by it against Appellant. For example, rather than finding that a judgment of 
almost a $100,000.00 that was the basis of the restitution order was fully satisfied through 
an execution sale of Appellant's home in 1995, the committee instead concluded that 
Schwenke failed to pay Caren Serr. 
Moreover, all the answers provided in response to the committee's questions were 
true to the best of Appellant's knowledge and belief. Indeed, the Appellant disclosed all 
of the negative information about him, his finances and his personal life. Instead of 
appreciating the honesty in the disclosure of negative information, the committee treated 
the negative information as a sign of a bad person that does not deserve to be reinstated. 
The committee did not like the fact that Appellant has tax problems and still owes taxes 
and has not filed taxes in the last few years. The committee did not like that Appellant is 
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involved in several law suits as both a plaintiff or a defendant and some of the law suits 
involve claims of fraud. The committee did not like that Appellant was arrested (but 
acquitted) for DUI three times. The committee did not like that Appellant had access to 
$1.5 million but failed to pay the restitution or the disputed taxes. Perhaps under Rule 6-1, 
these subjective considerations by the committee are applicable, but not under the 
objective standard of Rule 25. In total, the report is clearly the product of a committee 
prejudiced by the prior conduct that resulted in Appellant's disbarment and other conducts 
unacceptable to the committee. Accordingly, the Appellant respectfully urges the court to 
strike the report, and instead review the transcript of the hearing and the exhibits and enter 
independent findings free from prejudice. 
6. Does the Office of Admission's imposition of Rule 14 and 
Rule 6-1, Rules of Admissions, instead of Rule 25, RLDD, a 
violation of Appellant's Equal Protection Rights and Due 
Process Rights. 
(1) Equal Protection claim. 
The Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: "[a]ll laws of a general 
nature shall have uniform operation.", and the United States Constitution amend. XIV, § 1 
prohibits a state from enacting laws that deny "any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws". These constitutional provisions while dissimilar in language 
embody the same general principle that "persons similarly situated should be treated 
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their 
circumstances were the same." Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89 (Utah 2002) citing Malan 
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984); and Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 
346, 355-56 (Utah 1997). In this case, Appellant belong to a class of lawyers that have 
been suspended for longer than six months or have been disbarred. Rule 25, RLDD 
governs applications for reinstatement or readmission to membership in the Bar for this 
class of lawyers. The Appellant is a member of this class, yet the Bar singled out the 
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Appellant and forced him to comply with procedure and standard that is clearly different 
from the procedure and standard required of the rest of the class of lawyers. Appellant's 
right to equal protection under both the State and Federal constitutions has clearly been 
violated by the Bar's imposition of a different procedure and standard in his application 
for reinstatement. 
(2) Due Process claim. 
Article I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah, states: "No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Similarly, United States Constitution, 
amend. XIV, sec. 1 provides that no state shall deprive any person of property without due 
process of law. For this analysis, Appellant assumes that both the Utah and the United 
States due process provisions are identical in application. The first step in a due process 
analysis is a determination of whether a recognizable life, liberty or property right is at 
stake. If so, whether or not the circumstances show that the protect able right has been 
violated or the deprivation of the right was made without the required legal process. 
Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768, 348 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah App. 1998). 
Appellant has been deprived of his right to practice law. This right is well settled, 
recognized, and characterized as a right, "not a matter of grace and favor" Wiliner v. 
Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102-05, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 83 S. Ct. 
1175 (1963) (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1867)), 
but instead a "fundamental righf \ Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 
274, 84 L. Ed. 2d 205, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 53 U.S.L.W. 4238, 4240 (U.S. 1985). Indeed, 
"[s]tate courts must afford attorneys due process rights before denying their admission to 
the state bar on the grounds of questionable moral character." See Willner, supra at 102-5. 
Accordingly, Appellant's right to practice law is a fundamental right protected by the due 
process clause of both the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
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The final inquiry is whether Appellant's fundamental right has been violated. 
Appellant respectfully urge the Court to find in the affirmative. The violation started with 
the denial on May 29, 2001 by the committee of Appellant's application for reinstatement 
before the committee's investigation started or completed. Indeed, the investigation took 
almost a month to complete, but after Appellant's application had already been denied. 
More importantly, the committee applied the erroneous Rule 14, and Rule 6-1, Rules of 
Admission procedure and standard when it denied Appellant's application. Moreover, the 
committee hearing and its final recommendation were also made and based on the same 
erroneous procedure and standard of the rules of admissions. Expanding the scope of the 
committee investigation to include Appellant's entire life history and including the events 
he had been punished for already; instead of the limited scope of inquiry under Rule 25 to 
ascertain if Appellant had the "honesty and integrity to practice law" is not only a 
disparate treatment in violation of equal protection but a clear violation of Appellant's 
right to due process. 
7. Does the State of Utah's scheme to regulate the practice of 
law violates the constitutional mandate for separation of 
power; and this violation in turn violates the Equal 
Protection rights of the Appellant in particular and Utah 
licensed lawyers in general; 
(1) Separation of Power. 
Article V §1, Utah Constitution provides for separation of the three departments of 
government. The separation of governmental powers between the three departments of 
government; the Legislative, the Administrative and the Judiciary, as distinct and 
independent and free from the control of the other, was judicially recognized by a majority 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60. The separation of power issue has arisen 
primarily in connection with contests between departments. See for example; Scott M, 
Matheson v. Miles 'Cap Perry, 641 P.2d 674 (UT. 1982); Gallivan, supra at 89; and 
Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941). Appellant 
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has not found a case wherein an individual asserted a claim against the government under 
the separation of power clause. Nevertheless, there are numerous cases where the courts 
view the separation of power as "probably, the most important principle of government 
declaring and guaranteeing the liberties of the people." Matheson, supra, quoting Searle 
v. Yemen, 118 Neb. 835, 841, 226 N.W. 464, 466, 69 ALR. 257, 261 (1929). (Emphasis 
added). Justice Oaks concurring in Matheson, supra, also held that the purpose of the 
separation of powers is to restrain and regulates the exercise of government power "to 
protect individual liberties." (Emphasis added). 
If indeed the separation of power provisions of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions are to protect individual liberties, it follows that the lack of it, takes away the 
protection of individual liberties. In other words, an individual subjected to the exercise of 
all the three powers of government in one department of the government is denied 
protection of his individual liberties. The Appellant is and has been subjected to a scheme 
to regulate the practice of law that clearly violates Article V §1 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Supreme Court exercises legislative power through it's rule making authority as 
authorized in Article VIII §4 of the Utah Constitution. The Supreme Court exercises 
administrative, including prosecutorial power, through its agent the Utah State Bar. The 
Supreme Court exercises judicial power through its agent the district court. Where is 
Appellant's protection of his individual liberties when he is subjected to the whim of one 
department of the government exercising all the governmental powers? 
The clear answer is that there is no protection of individual liberties under the 
Supreme Court's scheme to regulate the practice of law. Appellant has first hand 
experience of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the present scheme. In the matter of 
the Discipline of A, Paul Schwenke, 849 P.2d 573 (Utah 1991), R. 346-349, Appellant 
challenged the validity of the service of process at his former office address while he was 
out of the state. Justice Howe found the service of process constitutionally defective. On 
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the very same facts, service of process at the same former office address, Justice Durham 
found constitutionally valid service. See In re A, Paul Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350 (Utah 
1993). R. 342-345. The difference in the two cases was an affidavit in the latter case that 
made its way into the record two weeks after the appeal was filed. Appellant's efforts to 
point out the fraud on the Court fell on death ears. How can the Supreme Court bring 
fraud charges on itself for its agent's conduct? To get rid of Appellant's claim, Chief 
Justice Zimmerman appointed his friend Ron Yengish, who around the same time was a 
co-actor with Justice Zimmerman in a play at the University of Utah, to investigate the 
allegations. Mr. Yengish concluded that there was no fraud because it would not have 
made any difference if the document was back dated. 
The instant case is another example. The Supreme Court's agent, the Utah State 
Bar was bound and determined to exclude Appellant from membership in the Bar. The 
agent imposed a clearly erroneous procedure and standard in order to accomplish its aim. 
The Supreme Court's agent, the district court, accepted without question, it's sister agent, 
the Utah State Bar's claim that Rule 14 and 6-1, Rules of Admissions governs Appellant's 
application for reinstatement. The Supreme Court while acknowledging that the proper 
rule was Rule 25, RLDD, instead of the rules advocated by the Bar, refused to correct the 
Bar's error. 
(2) Equal Protection. 
The protection of individual liberties through the exercise of governmental powers 
by three separate and independent departments is denied to Appellant, in particular, and 
lawyers licensed to practice law in Utah, in general. All other professionals licensed by 
the State of Utah operate and practice their respective trades and professions with the 
benefits and protection of personal liberties accorded under the separation of power 
provision of the Utah Constitution. Medical doctors, while most belong to medical 
associations, are licensed and regulated by the Administrative department, according to 
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laws enacted by the Legislature or rules promulgated by agencies with delegaled rule 
making powers, and when any laws or rules are at issue, could turn to the independent 
judiciary for interpretation and resolution of the issues. All licensed trade workers and 
professionals are governed under a similar scheme except lawyers. United States 
Constitution amend. XIV, § 1 prohibits a state from enacting laws that deny "any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws". Here, lawyers are being treated 
different and are denied protection of their individual liberties by being subjected to a 
regulatory scheme where all the powers of government reside in the one entity regulating 
them. 
The Supreme Court justifies its hold on the three powers of government as 
necessary for the self-governing of lawyers because they are in a unique relationship to the 
processes of government and law enforcement. Self-regulation is suppose to help 
maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination and in 
preserving government under law. This belief is founded on the rationale that a profession 
whose members are not dependent on the government for the right to practice is more 
ready and willing to challenge the government. While these goals and aspirations are 
helpful in maintaining the independence of the judiciary in relation to other departments of 
the government, none addresses the loss or the lack of protection of individual liberties of 
the lawyers where the Supreme Court exercises all powers of government, The present 
scheme of regulating lawyers, notwithstanding any justification, is unconstitutional under 
both the Utah and United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bar and district court violated the strict time limitations imposed on them by 
Rule 25, RLDD. For violation of Rule 25, Appellant urges the Court to remand to the 
district court with instructions to immediately review the Petition and enters his ruling 
based on the assertions of the Verified Petition without a hearing. In ruling on the 
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Petition, and under the circumstances of the imposition by the Bar and committee of the 
wrong rules, the district court must abate the requirements for taking and passing the Bar 
exams and abate the requirement for recommendation by the committee. Alternatively, 
and based on the violation of Appellant's Equal Protection and Due Process rights under 
both the Utah and United States constitutions, the Court should order Appellant's 
immediately reinstatement. 
Respectfully submitted this _± day of October, 2002. / ' 
A. PauKSchwenke, Pro Se 
Petitioner/Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
An addendum is not necessary. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _/_ day of October, 2002,1 hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Ms. Kate A. ToQmey, attorney for the 
OPC, Utah State Bar at 645 S 200 E, SLC, UJ 84111. 
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